London - This year's Military Balance 2014, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, is packed with facts, figures, tables and maps analysing military organisations, inventories and defence funding. There is extensive and detailed assessment of defence matters, not only in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, but also in Latin America, Russia, North America and Africa. Specialist essays focus on: trends in conflict analysis, notably lessons from modern conflicts in terms of threats and required capabilities; unmanned systems, increasingly prevalent in many armed forces and likely to proliferate further; and the cyber domain, according to John Chipman, Director-General and CEO of the Institute.
He adds that "our analysis sets out ways of measuring cyber capability, developing recent work at the IISS and reflecting our broader research programme on cyber power. Meanwhile, the chart of conflict is updated for 2014." The chart usefully illustrates the distribution and duration of conflicts that dominate life for governments and societies across the world. Chipman points out that this year’s Military Balance is published at a time when defence planners globally are confronted by a fractured and increasingly complex security environment.

The report of over 500 pages is an annual assessment of the military capabilities and defence economics of 171 countries worldwide.
The introduction is focused on Financial and strategic rebalances challenge defence planners and reads as follow:
In 2013, a war in Mali and the threat of international military force against Syria, in response to the use
there of chemical weapons, highlighted the challenge for defence planners of unanticipated events.
At the same time, a range of familiar and more fundamental issues persisted, including the relative shift in
the balance of military power to Asia, amid tensions in that region. Asian defence budgets rose again, as
did equipment purchases. More Asian states are building their military capabilities, some of which
are related to general force modernisation; others that could be used for power projection or for deterrence.
Meanwhile, the Middle East and North Africa remained gripped by the consequences of the Arab
Spring, including the conflict in Syria and its wider effects, continued turbulence in North Africa and the
wider impact of this on Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as Iran’s nuclear programme. In the region, some states
continued substantial procurement programmes.
Amidst all this, however, defence budgets in the West continued to contract and governments grappled
with the policy requirement to balance financial imperatives with strategic priorities and risks.
For these and the following reasons, 2014 will be a significant year for many armed forces in the West.
The withdrawal of most foreign military forces from Afghanistan and the end of ISAF’s combat mission
there mean that it is not just the United States that is viewing the end of this campaign as a ‘strategic
turning point’, to use a phrase coined by then-US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta in 2012.
For Panetta, the forthcoming end of a decade of wars essentially fought on land gave the US a chance
to reassess force structures, roles and inventories.
It provided an opportunity to ‘rebalance’ towards the Asia-Pacific. But for Panetta’s successor, Chuck
Hagel, continuing uncertainty over defence budget allocations was reflected in policymakers’ concern
over whether sequestration or similarly severe cuts in defence spending would continue. If sequestration
were to continue, according to scenarios in the Strategic Choices and Management Review ordered
by Hagel, there was a danger that the Pentagon’s 2012 defence strategic guidance would either ‘bend’
or ‘break’. More detail on how the Pentagon may attempt to accommodate further cuts will probably
form a central element of the Quadrennial Defense Review, due in February 2014, which will also be
scrutinised for greater insight into how the US now interprets the experience of the last 12 years of war,
and the degree to which it will try to institutionalise these lessons.
Similar reflection is taking place among the armed forces of many of the other countries that contributed
to the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Defence spending is shrinking in European countries at a time
when the reorientation of US defence policy towards the Asia-Pacific places a greater share of the burden
for international security on them, particularly in Europe’s fragile vicinity to the south and the east.
They therefore face a loss of capability and influence, making all the more pressing initiatives – such
as those from within NATO and the European Union – to maximise value from defence budgets through
closer cooperation. The results of these institutional efforts have so far been lacklustre. NATO’s ‘Smart
Defence’ initiative and the EU’s equipment pooling and sharing approach, both designed to increase
systematic and closer defence collaboration among member states, continue to be plagued by patchy
progress, while NATO’s ‘defence matters’ initiative seemed to be met with at best a resigned shrug
in many European states. While the importance of these measures may be recognised by defence policymakers in member states, total European defence spending continues to fall in real terms, by an average of 2.5% per year since 2010. As a result, finding the resources to support military capabilities will become more difficult and will place increasing importance on achieving more effective cooperation regarding future capabilities.
France’s Mali operation, beginning in January 2013, highlighted the positive and negative aspects
of contemporary European defence efforts. Agile, tough and operationally experienced forces deployed
quickly, were able to adapt plans and tactics, fuse intelligence, surveillance and strike assets, and work
well with regional and international partners. But several partners were also vital to fill shortcomings
exposed in France’s capabilities, such as strategic lift, airborne refuelling and persistent surveillance.
France’s 2013 White Paper illustrated the difficulties defence planners now face from financial pressure
and continuing strategic uncertainty. However, though defence cuts will bite, Paris managed to avoid
losing any capabilities in their entirety, a step that has already been taken by some European states. If
reductions continue, particularly in an uncoordinated fashion, the risk is that European states may be less
able to act effectively in future crises.
Crises will continue to erupt and demand attention. Turbulence in North Africa, for instance, is the
latest ‘new normal’ for some US defence policymakers. Whether European states will be willing
to act is another question. The debate over what to do about the conflict in Syria, sharpened by the
chemical weapons issue, has demonstrated that the past decade’s wars have left Western electorates
at best unsure of their success or necessity. As well as balancing budgets, capabilities and risk, states
wanting to retain the option of military intervention now also need to re-establish a convincing narrative
to explain and justify the use of the armed forces in international crisis management.
NATO has tried to shape the debate on these matters, with the secretary-general saying he believed
that ‘without the credible threat of military force, Syria would not have agreed to the destruction of its stock of chemical weapons’, and that working together in NATO offered political credibility, legitimacy and
military effectiveness. But the end of combat operations in Afghanistan poses a challenge to NATO; it
marks the end of an intense period of operational activity for the Alliance, and NATO is itself perhaps
now at a strategic turning point. Leaders of NATO member states meeting at the Alliance’s 2014 summit
in the UK will face a range of pressing, though not existential, issues, notably the shape of a ‘post-operational alliance’. Although NATO allies have made significant progress on interoperability as a result
of operations, this will be difficult to maintain in the face of decreasing spending and the lower operational
tempo expected following the 2014 ISAF drawdown.
NATO has further internationalised as a result of Afghanistan; it developed close operational links
with non-NATO ISAF states. Meanwhile, its agenda now includes ballistic-missile defence, cyber security
and out-of-area maritime security tasks. Keeping NATO members and partner nations engaged will
also prove a challenge post-2014, as defence-policy aspirations may well focus closer to home.
In the Middle East, Syria, Iran and Israel still dominate regional security calculations. In 2013, the
struggle between the Assad regime and rebel forces was compounded by conflict within rebel ranks,
direct intervention on the regime’s side by Hizbullah, growing numbers of foreign Sunni jihadist fighters,
and further refugee flows. The use of chemical weapons in Syria provoked a crisis: a threat, though
hesitant, of international force, and eventual agreement following Russia’s initiative on the destruction
of Syria’s chemical stockpile. Realising in late 2012 that much of the territory it had lost was either irretrievable or not worth the cost, the Assad regime set more realistic objectives and sought to adapt military strategy to shrinking resources and manpower. Both the number and rank of defectors fell from late 2012,reflecting a general assessment that Assad’s chances of survival had improved. Among rebel forces, meanwhile, fragmentation and radicalisation continued and while the provision of foreign-funded weaponry gave rebels temporary advantage in the south, the supplies were not sustained enough to allow for such advances to be consolidated. Fear of regional escalation and missile and chemical weapon threats
compelled Jordan, Israel and Turkey to enhance their air- and missile-defence systems.
Missile defence remains a key priority area for other states in the Middle East, particularly in the
Gulf, where the perceived threat from Iran’s missile arsenal concerns defence planners. Gulf states such
as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have bought, or are buying, the most advanced Western missileand
air-defence and strike systems, including standoff air-launched munitions. Middle Eastern states
like these have spent significantly on defence in recent years, and there remains substantial, and in
some cases growing, Western military interest in the region: the West remains the source of most procurements in the Gulf; the US retains significant forces there and France – and the UK – have reinvigorated their regional defence relations with Gulf states. But though security concerns, attractive procurement deals and spending hikes in that region might lead some to perceive in this European attention something of a rebalance of their own, because of financial constraints their contributions will, in comparison with the US presence, remain modest.
While some Middle Eastern procurements might have generated headlines, like those in Asia, countries
in other regions are also developing, and purchasing, more advanced weapons, though the amount and
sophistication of these will depend on budgets,defence plans, and procurement and technical ambitions.
States in Latin America and Africa, for instance, are buying more advanced equipment, while Russia,
despite shortcomings in defence-industrial capacity, has a long history of complex weapons research and
development and can produce – and sell – formidable guided weapons like Onyx/Bastion, Kaliber, and the
S-350/S-400, as well as platforms like the Sukhoi T-50 combat aircraft.
Advanced military technologies are proliferating for reasons including lower technical barriers to entry,
increasing application of dual-use technology and states’ willingness to sell such technologies. These
include capabilities previously seen almost exclusively in Western armed forces, such as unmanned
systems. The use by the US of UAVs as strike assets in Pakistan and elsewhere has sharpened focus not only on the increasing inventories of unmanned systems, but also on the legal and ethical debates that accompany their use; these debates will increase with developments in autonomous control (see p. 13).
Amid pressured defence budgets and contracting defence ambitions, some states in the West may look
to retain a capability edge through the pursuit of even more advanced military technologies: hypersonics
is one example; active and passive multi-spectral low-observable research is another. Defence investment
in the West, notably in traditionally expensive R&D, may need to be scaled in such a way that this
‘edge’ can be retained. Some planners might also see such capabilities as facilitating easier engagement
options. However, notwithstanding any desire by policymakers to move away from the substantial
ground commitments that have been central to recent Western wars, the complexities of modern conflict,
explored between pp. 9–12, as well as recent history, ought to temper expectations for the effect advanced technologies can deliver.
In Asia, meanwhile, states continue to improve military capabilities against the backdrop of rising
tensions among powers in the region. In real terms, Asian defence spending in 2013 was 11.6% higher
than in 2010. The largest absolute spending increases occurred in East Asia, with China, Japan and South
Korea accounting for more than half of all the real increases in Asian defence spending in 2013.
Procurement has been wide-ranging, and in the larger Asian states (most importantly, China) indigenous
defence industry has played an increasing role in providing military equipment. The growing
importance of cyber was highlighted by the reported activities of China’s PLA, though other Asian – and
global – states continued to increase financial and material resources in this sector.
However, translating equipment into real capability – including in the space and cyber spheres – is
another matter, and regional states do not yet possess the full range of operational abilities, including individual military skills and training regimes seen, for instance, in many Western armed forces that
deployed to Afghanistan. Nonetheless, armed forces in the region are becoming more powerful. China’s
2013 White Paper was reflective of Beijing’s drive to become a major maritime power, among other
military imperatives, and the paper emphasised the need for blue-water naval capabilities in protecting
China’s sovereignty, sea lines of communication and maritime resources. By late 2013, the Chinese aircraft
carrier Liaoning had embarked on its third set of sea trials, including more deck landings of the J-15 naval
fighter aircraft. Reports suggested that China was in the early stages of constructing in Shanghai a second
‘flat-top’. Meanwhile, India launched the hull of its first domestically built carrier, while it was also introducing
into service the MiG-29K combat aircraft that will be deployed on India’s other new carrier, the
Vikramaditya. Also, Japan launched its largest naval vessel since the Second World War, the helicopter
carrier Izumo. But maritime programmes were not the only focus. Japan has bought the F-35, Singapore
is likely to do the same and some analysts believe South Korea may also choose this aircraft. India
is partnering with Russia in the T-50 programme, while China is continuing to revamp its air force and
develop new aircraft types, including those known as the J-20 and J-31.
In this arena, with Asian states developing and procuring advanced capabilities previously dominated
by Russia and the West, the contrast is stark.
Europe’s aerospace industry, for instance, does not have a manned combat-aircraft programme in place
after current types finish production. Other sectors of Europe’s defence industry are under pressure from
falling orders and increased foreign competition.
Amid falling budgets, European states might want to become more relevant in Asian defence but, at least
individually, it is hard to see how they can do so in the way that the US can, given its established position
in the region and as a defence supplier to many Asian countries. While Europe, and NATO, will want to
remain globally engaged, doing so in a realistic way will probably be challenging, given reduced finances
and preoccupation with Europe’s unstable southern neighbourhood – leaving aside the question of
whether states would be willing to act. The degree to which robust combat capabilities can be retained by
Western states, as well as the degree to which those that are retained could be used, remains in doubt.
As a consequence, some may look to develop more civil–military, whole-of-government approaches so
that they can project stability without necessarily projecting force. Others might look to leverage potential
benefits from coordinated deployments or from defence partnerships with foreign states; these are
possible areas of exploitation for NATO. But as Mali showed, crises can develop quickly, in inaccessible
areas against adaptable non-state (and perhaps state) adversaries, requiring the rapid use of robust military
force, including the possible deployment of ground troops, and in response to policy imperatives that
might not always be shared by partners. Asian states will be mindful of the same issues, as well as others
such as natural disasters, but they do not face the same financial impediments as their Western counterparts.
At the same time, Asia lacks security mechanisms that could defuse regional crises, and is replete
with economic, political and resource competition, opposing territorial claims and long-standing flashpoints.
The rapid pace of capability development and the potential for accidental conflict and escalation in
Asia will continue to be a matter of concern.